Shujat Ali Shahid, Department of International Relations, Jadavpur University
Climate Security Mechanism (CSM) is one of the foremost designs being adopted in addressing risks of climate security. Launched jointly by the United Nations Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA), United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in 2018, CSM seeks to hit at the roots of the “action gap” between the ambition of integrative study and prevalent conditions. For a start, the CSM has and can be used to raise awareness and connect UN bodies together to take action, despite its current limitation of mandate and resources. To reduce the catastrophic effects on communities affected by climate disasters and change, particularly the Small Island Developing States (SIDS) and the Least Developed Countries (LDCs), the CSM is reflective of an integrative approach characterised by peace-positive climate action and climate-sensitive peace and conflict resolution approaches. At the same, it has to be conceded that this initiative is still in its nascent stage and would require a broader mandate to be more fruitful. However, with sustained efforts, of which CSM is also a part, the link between climate and security has tightened.
After initially relying on bilateral contributions, the UN Multiparty Trust Fund Office (MPTFO) served as the main funding outlet for CSM. By 2022, USD 12.5 million was allotted for the functions of the CSM. The narrative over the years has shifted from viewing security as climate-blind to looking to climate-proof security dimensions. The current positioning of the CSM is that if implemented meticulously, it can bridge the gap between 3 professional communities : those working on security, those working on climate change and those working in the developmental sector. For instance, the UN Office for West Africa and Sahel (UNOWAS), UN Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA) and the Office of the Special Envoy (OSE) partner with CSM to address climate disasters and mitigate destruction caused, with CSM acting as a funding conduit and an expertise body. CSM has also assisted Lake Chad Basin Commission in capacity-building through deployment of professionals, so that the body can respond more effectively to climate risks and implement the Regional Stabilisation Strategy for the Lake Chad Basin in a more visionary form. Further elucidating the link between climate and security, the CSM funded the UN Mission in South Sudan via deployment of a Climate Security Advisor. Thus, tailored contributions seem to be the most effective in CSM’s functioning but more of these activities are required.
The relevance of the CSM follows the same path as any other internationally formulated mechanism- organic with signs of decay. With the increase in literature and research on climate security, intersections of climate and peace, conflict and environment have become new agendas on the climate security paradigm, with more such nuances currently in the pipeline. Now the problem statement which is unfurled is how to increase its outreach to match the rate at which demands and needs are growing. The focus field initiatives are increasingly targeting renewed and consistent threats in regions most vulnerable but most of the tasks are carried out by the UNDPPA. In any climate-related policy, as with other policies, availability of information at hand is essential for the potent implementation of the said policy. This has been a source of concern for the CSM as often, personal contacts are used by one of the four entities to obtain information from one another. The definition and transmission of information has become a real source of difficulty in effective implementation.
Even after all such constraints, the CSM has mostly been able to surpass its expected outputs. During the global Covid-19 pandemic, though there were sustained delays, the CSM completed its projects and activities. While such progress is appreciable, the Executive Report submitted by Emery Brusset to CSM Joint Steering Committee in 2022 highlights certain signs of stagnation. While the CSM was able to complete its programmes, the path of climate security action, to reach its maturity stage, needed more localised knowledge which could be readily applicable to specific cases. Hence, the Report suggested a speedy drive to a transitional stage in order for the CSM to ‘take off’ to greater heights. At the same time, the number of entities making use of the knowledge facilitated by the CSM is increasing and the frequency of climate related risk assessments has risen drastically, highlighting the impact of the venture. The impact is to a considerable extent hindered by the narrow funding mechanism of the CSM, drawn primarily from northern Europe. Sustained efforts are required to broaden this base and bring in a larger list of stakeholders. Moreover, one of the key weaknesses of the CSM is the inability to translate information available (like risk mitigation measures) into concrete policy frameworks. In order to address this caveat, skill development programmes need to be conducted so that the members are able to combine their skillset with various fields of expertise required. The small size of the CSM personnel has prevented it from being actively involved in food security and environment peacebuilding.
With a securitisation of climate expressed through a move from the phrase ‘climate and security’ to one which reads ‘climate security’, the onus is on both developing and developed countries to address these concerns, with obviously the first and pivotal steps to be taken by the developed world. In this light, the CSM is a step in the right direction. If a few issues are addressed in its functioning, it can have a positive bearing on the future of climate action. The need of the hour is to gain wider acceptability through advancing conceptual clarity and empirical evidence and more generally, to preserve the features of a mechanism, a design.
REFERENCES
- Brusset, Emery. Rep. Evaluation of the Climate Security Mechanism . UNDP, 2022. https://mptf.undp.org/sites/default/files/documents/2022-11/evaluation_of_csm_phase_ii_final_report_2022.pdf.
- Kabalan, Ramy. “Climate Security Mechanism .” United Nations. Accessed September 4, 2025. https://www.un.org/climatesecuritymechanism/en/about/climate-security-mechanism.
- Reda, Dima, and Catherine Wong. “Climate Finance for Sustaining Peace: Making Climate Finance Work for Conflict-Affected and Fragile Contexts.” UNDP, December 14, 2021. https://www.undp.org/publications/climate-finance-sustaining-peace-making-climate-finance-work-conflict-affected-and-fragile-contexts.
- Brants, Armands. “Addressing the Impact of Climate Change on Peace and Security | Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs.” United Nations. Accessed September 4, 2025. https://dppa.un.org/en/addressing-impact-of-climate-change-peace-and-security.
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