Abstract
Over two centuries after its independence, the United States of America continues to assert itself as the principal custodian of the liberal international order, a position that was symbolically reinforced through contemporary political gestures and elite narratives that continue to associate the United States as the defender of liberal values. Frequently portrayed as a champion of political liberation, the United States has historically justified its global expansion in ideological terms associated with freedom and democracy in the post-colonial world. As of 2026, this claim to singular moral and political leadership is being challenged, more so internally than by any external force. In this paper, we explore the historical processes and the structural forces that facilitated the rise of the US to its current position while analysing the empirical data to trace the rise of India, from a stranger to an ally and presently, as a challenger to the throne that has been held by the US contributing to its predominance. As India gains ground economically and more evidently, diplomatically, the question remains unresolved. The paper traces the growth achieved by India over the last three decades, while having focused on South-South cooperation, as evident in policy introductions under the current Indian government. Due to its proactive role, India is being viewed through a similar lens as the US, however, this paper stands to challenge this narrative with statistical and empirical evidence that India is not at the capacity to take over the throne of the United States if we were to enter into a world without the latter’s looming presence.
Introduction
The liberal order, as we know, refers to the economic normative and institutional framework established under the United Nations after 1945. Emerging as a consequence of the devastating, after effects of the second world war, this order was designed to prevent large scale conflicts, stabilize the global economy and promote political liberalism. Grounded in multilateralism, open markets, collective security and democratic governance institutions, such as the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank institutionalised cooperation and embedded US leadership with rules based framework. Structural transformation and not systemic collapse is what seems to be characterising the liberal world order, which is often portrayed as its decline. Shifts in global power distribution, the resurgence of nationalism and the rise of emerging powers have reconfigured the architecture of international politics. Within this evolving order, India occupies a pivotal yet non-hegemonic position. Rather than seeking to replace American dominance, India aims to navigate between alignment and autonomy, reshaping the liberal framework from within while advancing its own strategic interests.
Rise of U.S. Hegemony and the Unipolar Moment
Historical Context
The transition to a liberal world order following the second World War was not a passive evolution, but rather, it was a calculated institutional project that codified United States hegemony. Central to this project was the Bretton Woods System system, which helped the United States leverage disproportionate economic weight— representing approximately 50% of global industrial output in 1945 to establish the US dollar as the world’s primary reserve currency. By securing the IMF and the World Bank in Washington D.C, the US was able to establish structural control over global reconstruction. The IMF, in particular, institutionalized this dominance through a weighted voting system where the US maintains a 16.5% share, effectively granting it the only individual veto power over major constitutional changes. Additionally, NATO provided the essential security framework to protect such market interests. By extending a “nuclear umbrella” over Western Europe, NATO formalized a hierarchy of security dependence, allowing the United States to project military power globally, while subsidizing the stability required for liberal trade. Collectively, these institutions functioned as an amplifier for American influence, creating a rule-based regime that prompted participation in a US- centric global economy while marginalising non-aligned powers. This system of financial surveillance through the IMF and collective defence through NATO, transitioned the US from a regional actor to the central facilitator of a globalized and liberal order.
Unipolar Moment
Formerly beginning with the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Unipolar Moment was an event that eliminated the only existential threat to US power and left Washington as the “sole superpower.” This era can be categorized in two distinct phenomena: the geopolitical vacuum and the globalization of neoliberalism. With the collapse of the USSR, the bipolar equilibrium that defined international relations for 4 decades vanished. Krauthammer (1991) argues that this was not a transition to multipolarity, but a shock that left the US as the decisive player in every region in the globe. The US tactfully utilised this vacuum to expand its security umbrella notably pushing NATO eastward, a move that would have been impossible during the Cold War. Ideologically, the unipolar moment coincided with the global expansion of neoliberal capitalism, often summarized as the “Washington Consensus.” The US aggressively promoted market liberalization, privatisation and deregulation as the universal standard for economic development. The US solidified its structural power, by integrating former Communist and non-aligned forces into a US-centric global market in which free trade became a mechanism of statecraft.
The durability of this moment rested mainly on four pillars of structural power that prevented the rise of effective counter-balancing authorities. The most visible driver of this was the scale of the US military superiority. Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, U.S defence spending exceeded that of the next 10-15 countries combined. The US possessed the unique logistical capacity to project power globally through a network of over 800 military bases. This “command of the commons” (sea, air and space) deterred potential rivals, engaging in traditional arms races. Economic Unipolarity was maintained through the US dollar’s status as the world’s primary reserve currency. Despite the end of gold convertibility in 1971, the dollar remained the anchor of global trade and finance. This exorbitant privilege allowed the US to run persistent deficits without facing the balance of payments crisis that would normally cripple nations, thus effectively funding its global hegemony through capital inflows. The US leveraged international institutions to legitimize its preferences. By holding de facto veto power in the IMF and the World Bank, Washington ensured that global financial assistance was conditional on adherence to US favoured economic policies. These institutions acted as “force multipliers,” for US foreign policy converting American unilateral intent into multilateral outcomes.
The Information Revolution of the 1990s— driven by the U.S. firms and government research, gave the American economy a productivity edge, and its military, a precision strike capability that other powers could not easily replicate. This served as a barrier against the entry of rising powers like China, at least during the initial decades of the post cold war era.
Decline of Liberal Hegemony
A number of factors could be taken into consideration for analysing the decline of liberal hegemony and a shift towards a more multilateral era. This decline can be largely attributed to structural weaknesses within the post-Cold war liberal international order. The efforts to promote democracy worldwide proved difficult and often provoked resistance. Characterised by nationalism, many states emphasised sovereignty and national identity making societies reluctant to accept external political influence. As a result , attempts to export liberal democratic institutions frequently generated backlash.
The liberal order also faced growing domestic challenges, with its emphasis on international institutions, globalization and relatively open borders, which sometimes conflicted with national political priorities in the leading liberal states. Simultaneously, globalisation accelerated the economic rise of emerging powers, such as China and the renewed influence of Russia. This shift in the global balance of power gradually ended the unipolar dominance of the United States and contributed to the emergence of a more competitive multipolar global order.
Where does India fit in all of this?
Economic Context
Since independence in 1947, India has adopted a development strategy, aimed at eliminating poverty, inequality and economic backwardness, while building a socialistic pattern of society within a democratic framework. The economic model was based on a mixed economy where both public and private sectors co-existed but the state assumed a dominant role in directive development. A series of 5 year plans were established for achieving economic growth during this period. The second 5 year plan emphasised heavy industrialization and placed the commanding.
The first 5 year plans assumed economic growth, with eventually leaders in poverty for trickle down effect, where institutional changes would distribute the benefits of development. However, by the early 70s, doubts emerged about the effectiveness of this approach. The growth generated by the planning model was too slow to produce significant surpluses needed for a distribution. Despite achieving some initial economic progress, the results were inadequate to fulfil India’s broader development goals revealing the cracks in the planned economic strategy.
A policy shift became necessary to address the limitations of earlier planning strategies. The Fifth Five-Year Plan (1974-79) redirected economic policy by emphasizing growth alongside redistribution. During the mid-1980s, India initiated limited economic liberalisation, to improve production and adapt to changing economic conditions. Several committees were established to guide reforms, including the Narasimhan Committee on replacing physical controls with fiscal mechanisms, the Sengupta Committee on public sector reforms and the Hussain Committee on trade policy. These recommendations led to deregulation during the 1980s.
In the Era of Cold War Politics and Beyond
India’s response to Cold War politics was characterised by strategic pragmatism. India aimed to secure its national interest while simultaneously maintaining its non-aligned stance. The partnership between India and the Soviet Union intensified during the late 1970s and 1980s providing India with significant military and economic assistance at a time in support from western countries remained limited. The Soviet Union supplied advanced defence technology and weaponry, enhancing India’s strategic capabilities in relation to Pakistan and China. Moreover, it also helped shield India from diplomatic isolation, led by the United States, particularly in response to its pursuit of nuclear capabilities.
Indo-US relations: Turbulent to Tactical
The early stages of Indo-US relations were marked by mutual suspicions and ideological differences. The US’s Pakistan centric policies disregarded India’s interests given that Pakistan was an important cog in the cold war strategy of the US in the South Asian region. The US remained wary of India’s strategic policies which were heavily tilted in favour of the erstwhile Soviet Union, raising questions about India’s Non-Aligned Policy.
Relations between India and the US became cordial during the period of John F. Kennedy. The two countries had never been involved in a direct confrontation, but their vision and approach to international politics had been in contrast with each other. However their relations made significant progress in the post cold war era. With the collapse of the soviet union and the economic liberalization of the 1990s, the two countries had a renewed perception of their bilateral relations.
A crack in this relationship occurred in response to the US trade relations affecting India’s export. Especially regarding the sale of F-16 aircrafts to Pakistan. However, India did not need to rely on US relations for long as it went through an advancement in technology that allowed it to engage with the rest of the world on its own terms.
Defence in strategic partnership remains another major area of cooperation. Since the early 2000s, the two countries jointly conducted military exercises, increased defense trade and engaged in strategic dialogue. The India United States civil nuclear agreement was a landmark development, which allowed civilian nuclear cooperation, despite India not being a signatory to the nuclear non proliferation treaty signalling a growing trust between the two nations.
Transformation under the Modi administration
The Indo-US relations have gone through a major transformation under Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s administration, particularly during the leadership of Donald Trump. The personal rapport between the two leaders played an important role in strengthening bilateral ties and advancing cooperation in several strategic areas. This has been evident in the areas of public diplomacy through events such as the Howdy Modi rally in Houston in 2019 and the Namaste Trump event in Ahmedabad in 2020.
Beyond symbolism, the relationship has also seen significant progress in defence cooperation, which is evident in India’s increased defense purchases from the United States, including helicopters in advanced military technology. Their joint military exercises have strengthened strategic coordination in the Indo-Pacific Region alongside cooperation within the quadrilateral security dialogue alongside partners like Japan and Australia.
The Trump administration adopted a tougher approach towards Pakistan, encouraging India to assume a larger role in ensuring security in the south asian region. The US continues efforts to position India as a net security provider in south asia and the indian ocean region. This approach has several implications. First, it strengthens India’s role as a credible security partner. Capable of helping balance the growing influence of China in Asia. Second, closer relations may act as a strategic counter to Pakistan’s expanding nuclear capabilities, which raise concerns about regional security and the risk of proliferation. Third, the United States benefits from the possibility of greater burden sharing in Afghanistan where India’s influence and development involvement are significant.
Support under the Modi administration continues to be evident even amid the recent political controversies and allegations surrounding the Trump administration which can be seen in the support received by India during the Indo-Pak conflict of 2025.
This relationship raises the question if India is being interpreted as part of Washington’s broader effort to balance the rise of China in Asia. However, it would be incorrect to say that India is merely an extension of the US strategy.
India as the voice of Global South
India’s influence in the global South has been shaped by its colonial past, reflecting through its advocacy for shared experiences and solidarity and not military power or economic subordination which makes for central characteristics in a hegemonic power. Instead, India has always pushed for diplomacy, representation and capacity building initiatives across Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Through years of nation building, strengthening its economy and post liberalisation of 1991 India has emerged as a significant power in the liberal world order.
India foreign policy reflects its need for strategic autonomy, peaceful coexistence, engagement that is driven by national interest, and non alignment. In the contemporary era it has increasingly focused on reform and has showcased a broader interest in securing the representation of other developing countries in bodies such as the United Nations Security Council. India, during its G20 presidency highlighted pressing issues like debt distress, green development, climate finance, Digital Public Infrastructure (DPI). Key outcomes include, the successful admission of the African Union (AU) as a permanent member in G20, and the consensus on reforming Multilateral Development Banks to facilitate better financing among others. Along with this India’s advocacy for South-South Cooperation within BRICS while avoiding exclusive bloc politics reinforces its identity as a bridge builder and not that of a hegemon. This approach of cooperative partnership through diplomacy and representation and not militarisation and economic subordination allows India to cultivate its influence in the increasing multipolar world. India’s rise is dependent on its ability to articulate the concerns of the global South while maintaining peaceful and independent relations within major powers like the United States, Europe, Russia and the developing world. Its growing influence suggests an alternative framework of power, one that is not based on domination but on representation, legitimacy and politics of inclusion in a multipolar world. While this strategy enhances India’s symbolic and moral authority it cannot be equated with hegemonic capacity. Representation and legitimacy generate influence, but they do not substitute for the material foundations of dominance traditionally associated with hegemony.
Competition and Power Structures
India’s current diplomatic outlook and policy orientation has invited speculation about its potential in replacing the current world order where the United States acts as a central pillar in the international system. The United States has an immense global power projection, a strong alliance network and extensive institutional authority within multilateral organisations such as the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Its permanency in the United Nations Security Council significantly impacts global security through its leveraging of its veto power. In contrast, powers such as China, Russia have displayed a clearer willingness to challenge components of the existing world order through military modernization, territorial assertiveness, alternative financial mechanisms and parallel institutional initiatives. These instruments- hard power projection, reserve currency leverage, alliance blocs, and rule setting dominance have historically constituted the material foundations of hegemonic replacement.
India’s trajectory diverges markedly from this pattern. Militarily, although India possesses significant conventional capabilities and credible nuclear deterrent, it lacks a comparable network of overseas bases or formalised security alliances similar to North Atlantic Treaty Organization that would enable sustained global power projection. Economically, despite rapid growth and expanding global market domestic market India doesn’t command the structural advantages of currency centrality, global capital dominance, or power supply chain control required to anchor a hegemonic system. Its currency does not function as a reserve medium, nor does it exercise decisive influence over international financial flows. Institutionally, India’s influence is exercised primarily through agenda setting and coalition building rather than systemic control. Its engagement within platforms such as the G20 and BRICS emphasize reform, representation, and inclusivity rather than the construction of alternative hierarchical order in alliance politics. India continues to privilege strategic autonomy and flexible partnerships over bloc-based leadership reflecting its preference for diplomatic manoeuvrability rather than command authority.
Ideological contrast
Challenges to global hegemony are not solely driven by shifts in economic or military power but also by competing ideologies. Since the end of the second world war the contemporary global system has largely been shaped by a liberal world order led by the United States, characterised by democracy, free trade and markets and multilateral institutions like the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the United Nations. However several major powers advance alternative ideological models that challenge these principles. The ideological orientation of major powers such as China, Russia, and North Korea highlight the growing ideological conflict surrounding the liberal world order.
China, promotes a system described as state-led capitalism combined with one-party political authority under the Chinese Communist Party, emphasising economic development, sovereignty, and non-interference rather than political liberalisation. Russia, particularly under the leadership of Vladimir Putin has a nationalist, sovereignty-oriented view that strongly resists Western Liberal intervention and seeks to reassert great power influence. Meanwhile, North Korea follows the doctrine of Juche, an extreme form of authoritarian self-reliance that prioritises regime survival, militarisation and extreme isolation from external influence. These contrasting ideologies have one common idea, resistance towards the liberal order’s universalist claims. They emphasize state control, security and national sovereignty over democratic governance and open markets.
Can the US be ‘dethroned?’
Russia and North Korea as contenders
While Russia can be credited largely for balancing the ever-so-increasing power of the US, as a sole power Russia lacks the hegemonic capabilities to “overthrow” the US. Due to its heavy reliance on energy exports to support the economy, it cannot shape global financial institutions or trade regulations in a way similar to that of the US or any previous hegemon. Similarly, North Korea’s limited economic resources and mainly its diplomatic isolation prevent it from gaining hegemonic momentum. Both Russia and North Korea are not propagators of the liberal world order which has historically been the ideological foundation of the US for the better part of the century. This disconnect prevents them from emerging as a global leader, acting more as a balancing weight.
Is China the next big power?
China’s rapid economic growth at the turn of the century has created space for debate regarding the “dethroning” of the United States of America and the establishment of a new hegemon. Jalil (2019) argues that the state oriented market economy responsible for China’s dramatic makeover could allow it to potentially replace US global leadership, given its growing political and military capabilities. From the lens of Power Transition Theory, uneven economic development among major powers often leads to shifts where the rapidly developing state may overtake an established power. The difference for China is the already globalised international economy which questions the unipolar or the hegemonic system as a whole.
China’s dramatic economic growth, large population, and looming presence in the region
could be argued as indicators of a rising hegemonic power, however the current international order is inclined towards liberal institutions and China’s infamous authoritarian political system may struggle to establish itself at a similar level as the USA. Other growing powers including Japan, Russia and India may be inclined to challenge and or balance China’s claim. This balancing act is most likely to direct the future international system into a multipolar order.
What India has and what it lacks
Credited to India’s economic, military and population growth in the last decade, it could be viewed as a contender viable to challenge US dominance in some capacity, but there exists a fundamental gap between the current stance of the USA and India at the global level. The United States fosters the most extensive military force in the world and used it internationally to allegedly, sustain the existing international order. The Indian military power is primarily regionally focused, used to promote India as a rising regional power.
Since the Cold War the United States has been recognised worldwide for its alliance network. Seen as a defining feature of American hegemony, the nation has built a dense network of security partnership and formal alliances that facilitate and reinforce US leadership. The recent events under the Trump administration may have left a sour taste for many alliance countries but it is not enough of a brute force to compel the disintegration of their alliance with America.
Economically, India has been focused on promoting trade ties within the developing countries, primarily in South-South cooperation whereas the United States chairs leadership in global financial institutions and control over international financial flow.
India’s approach to the international system showcases its steadily increasing capabilities as a regional power with great influence within developing countries rather than as a hegemonic power capable of challenging US dominance anytime soon.
India’s Role in World Politics
Since independence India’s political and foreign policy has been majorly concerned with Non-Alignment. The devastation caused by colonialism forced India to proceed with caution in world affairs and to put protection of its own over all else. This further persuaded India to engage in alliances or networks involving newly independent nations, promoting South-South cooperation.
In the last few decades India’s foreign policy has reflected its goal in garnering support and collaboration in the global south, visible through its policy of Look East (1991), Act East (2014), ASEAN (1967), SAARC (1985) and the Neighborhood First Policy (2008/14).
However, over the years it has been evident that India has consistently taken a neutral stance, unwilling to align itself with a prominent ideology or alliance. SAARC, ASEAN, and many other policies have not been a success at the expected scale and have prompted reconstruction at various levels.
India’s stance in international politics reflects a clear preference for a multipolar world order rather than seeking to position itself as an unipolar influence. This is visible in India’s participation in forums such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue , the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, BRICS and G20, which demonstrates its strategy of engaging with diverse power centers.
Conclusion
The evolution of the liberal international order reflects not a systemic collapse, but a gradual transition towards a more dispersed distribution of global power. While the United States continues to maintain significant military economic and institutional advantages.The rise of emerging powers has contributed to the development of a more complex and competitive multipolar system.
Within this changing order, India occupies a distinctive position, with its expanding economic capacity and diplomatic engagement, which seems to be a strengthening of global influence. But its foreign policy continues to prioritize strategic autonomy and multilateral cooperation rather than unipolar dominance. Through its participation in diverse geopolitical forums, India seeks to reform global governance while amplifying concerns of the Global South. Thus, India’s rise reflects not a bid for hegemonic succession of thrones but a contribution to the emergence of a multipolar world order.
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