Our paper starts from an exploration of a common understanding in contemporary IR that the crisis of multilateralism and global institutions are a case of recent decline of the liberal world order where states have turned more nationalist or unilateralist.
Such interpretations draw on developments such as U.S. withdrawals from 66 international organisations under the Trump administration, declining legitimacy of the UN in addressing ongoing global conflicts, the growing role of alternative platforms like BRICS, SCO and the QUAD, and efforts to reduce dependence on the U.S. dollar, including proposals for a BRICS payment system. (Crowe, 2025; Rubio, 2026; Tanvir, 2026).
But we contend that multilateral institutions have never been a neutral arena of competition to begin with. They have historically produced arrangements that stabilized particular distributions of power.
Plans of strategic autonomy today, including India’s issue-based alignments and BRICS cooperation, reflect attempts by Global South states to navigate these unequal structures.
At the same time, we see how despite being a victim of the Western-led Multilateralism, India is surprisingly today mimicking some of their tendencies to not just survive in the contemporary world but also strengthen their game of national interest and strategic autonomy in a growing competitive world economy.
Circling back to our focal point, we start with discussing that what is usually described today as the “crisis” of the liberal world order is therefore not necessarily a breakdown but may instead be a moment where underlying hierarchies have become more visible. So, the question is not only whether multilateralism is weakening, but whether it was ever structurally equal in the first place.
For the ease of the inquiry, we framed three questions.
1. Is the current crisis an institutional decline or the revelation of the long structural constraints ?
A useful starting point to look for an answer is the distinction made by Robert Cox between problem-solving theory and critical theory in his 1996 work – “Approaches to World Order”. Problem-solving approaches treat institutions as tools that help states cooperate and manage collective issues. They assume the framework is basically sound. Critical theory, by contrast, asks how that framework came into being, whose interests shaped it, and who benefits from its continuation. From this perspective, institutions are not outside power relations but expressions of them. They indeed stabilize order, but the order they stabilize may itself be unequal. (Cox & Sinclair, 1996)
For instance, the post-1945 Bretton Woods System provided financial stability, but allowed the U.S. an exponential influence over the international monetary system. (Eichengreen, 2011)
Mainstream liberal institutionalists see multilateralism as functional. Institutions reduce transaction costs, provide information, and facilitate cooperation. All of that may be true at a procedural level. But this functional reading misses something more structural: institutions can coordinate cooperation while still embedding hierarchy. Cooperation and inequality are not opposite. In fact, cooperation can be the very mechanism through which inequality is organized, and subsequently, normalized.
Grounding Cox’s understanding if we look at multilateral bodies historically there are several functions , but three of which keep appearing. (Cox, 1981)
i) Legitimization: institutions provide a language of rules and consensus that makes global arrangements appear collectively agreed rather than imposed.
ii) Stabilization: they reduce uncertainty by regularizing expectations, which is especially useful for dominant states that benefit from predictability.
iii) Socialization: they gradually shape what states consider acceptable behavior, so that even weaker states begin to internalize norms that were not originally theirs. These functions do not eliminate power asymmetry; they manage it.
This points to a similar analysis. The Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement under the WTO is an ideal case that illustrates the argument of Robert Cox that institutions “legitimize, stabilize, and socialize world order.”(Cox, 1981) The TRIPS agreement legitimized the importance of strong Intellectual Property rights, stabilized world capitalism by safeguarding investments in pharmaceuticals, and socialized states into the adoption of economic policies based on patents. Be it the 2000s South African protests against the patented HIV/AIDS medicine or the demand of COVID-19 waiver on the TRIPS agreement by South Africa and India, developing countries showed hesitance to uncritically accept the patent laws under the WTO’s framework.(Avafia & Narasimhan, 2006; Mellino, 2010).
Hence, borrowing from Cox’s understanding, one can perceive that the so-called current institutional decline has only revealed the long structural constraints.
Here we introduce our second question:
2. To what extent was post-war multilateralism shaped by unequal power relations between Western and Global South states?
The post-war multilateral institutions were the invention of some Western nations like the U.S., U.K., France, and others. But some of these countries themselves have been key actors in colonising major parts of the world earlier.
This becomes clearer when we read alongside post-development critiques such as those of Arturo Escobar who, in his book Encountering Development (1995), shows that development discourse historically positioned the Global South as an object of governance rather than an equal participant in defining global priorities. Applied to multilateralism, this suggests that many postwar institutions reflect the structural conditions and policy preferences of industrial Western states.
The U.S. and the G7 countries historically had a greater voting power in the decision-making processes of the IMF and WB since they contributed more financially than the Global South countries. (Woods, 2006).
- More money —> more votes –-> more control
While most of the Global South countries could not fund well due to severe financial constraints: a by-product of their historical colonisation. Also, the Western countries acted as the ‘lenders’ to the developing nations, and in exchange, demanded domestic policy changes, thus creating a ‘hierarchical’ relationship.
For instance, IMF loans to India in the 1990s required India to liberalise its economy on certain conditions set by the IMF. (Wikipedia, n.d.)
Narrative of Development & It’s Impact
As Escobar (1995) rightly highlights, the narrative of ‘development’ was sold to the developing countries by the West, solely, for preserving its own economic, political and strategic interests after WW 2. Hence, the idea of ‘development’ arose as a hegemonic discourse that produced Third World Countries as a problem, and rather than ‘solving’ it, it imposed Western norms.
Consequently, it backfired, as seen in the 1997 East Asian crisis, wherein, affected countries were already under an economic turmoil. The IMF bailed out some packages which only worsened the condition. (Stiglitz, 2002) Additionally, the formation of G20 in 1999 only confirmed the growing dissatisfaction among the developing nations against the mishandling of the then economic instability by the G7 countries. The idea of liberal multilateralism plunged further as the legitimacy of the Bretton Woods Institutions declined. It no longer reflected the real power of ‘equal’ distribution.
An analysis by Alok Sheel (2021) in Indian Council of World Affairs shows the pattern on unequal voting share in the IMF and the WB. The G7 countries had the voting share of around 43% while the share of the BRICS countries combined stood at the margin of a mere 15%, despite the latter’s rapidly growing economies. So, despite the massive economic weight of these countries, their institutional power was dismal.
Dependency theorists like Andre Gunder Frank( 1969) in his work The Development of the Underdeveloped trace the basis of this inequality back to the colonial times when ‘developed nations’ or the Metropol, functioned as the ‘core’ in extracting raw materials from the Satellite ‘developing and underdeveloped countries’, living at the exploited ‘periphery’. This reveals how the starting point itself has been deeply unequal.
Postcolonial scholars like Edward Said (1978) in his Orientalism went even further to illustrate how the West ‘constructs’ the knowledge of ‘East’ as derogatory and in severe need of the Western help.
This discourse of development legitimised later the Western-led Multilateralism upon the entire globe.
The World Trade Organisation, often seen as an equal and more democratic arena where decision-making is consensus-based, rather than vote-based, also reflects an unequal pattern in its proceedings. It is worthwhile to note how WTO also played a crucial role in propelling this decline even further, which brings us our third and final question.
3. How did institutional arrangements like the WTO cause dissatisfaction in developing countries?
Firstly, we would like to clarify as to why we emphasized more on the WTO, than the other regional organisations where inter-country trade is a common factor like ASEAN, NAFTA, SAFTA, etc. It is solely because WTO can be described best as the ‘mother of all trading organizations as it manages and facilitates global trade. (World Trade Organization, n.d.)
Amrita Narlikar (2005), in her book, World Trade Organisation – A Very Short Introduction displays the evolution of the institution from a basic trade organisation into a global economic regulator. While she asserts the importance of its rule-based governance that helps developing states bypass strict protectionism policies, the idea of its consensus-based decision-making is challenged. The Green Room Meetings of WTO are criticised for being undemocratic as only ‘selected’ countries are invited. (World Trade Observer, 1999) Besides, the expansion of the WTO’s boundary beyond tariffs, and into domestic policies of states are seen as deliberately intrusive.
The two major frameworks under the WTO are also often the most-talked-after agreements – the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) and the Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMS). Their primary objective is to smoothen the barriers in the arena of international trade, especially in the domains of IP rights and investment policies respectively.
Critics point out that while TRIMS shield foreign investors from restrictive national policies, it highly favours developed countries. (Karkason, 2024) Meanwhile, TRIPS ensures the global patent protection rules but is criticised for price inflation of essential generic drug production in developing states, as seen in the 2000s protests in South Africa against the patented drugs of HIV/AIDS.
Moreover, the litigation process of the Dispute Settlement Mechanism of the WTO is comparatively expensive for the developing states, thus making historically richer states of the West more influential. Despite the 2001 Doha Round aiming to prioritise the interests of the developing nations by reducing their agricultural subsidies, the final result was halted as the U.S. and the EU disagreed upon them. (Daemmrich, 2011).
Hence, various factors shape the ‘bargaining capacity’ like –
- Delegation size,
- Technical expertise,
- Access to legal resources, and
- Dependence on export markets
Negotiations that are formally multilateral can still yield outcomes tilted toward actors with greater structural leverage. Dissatisfaction, then, is not simply frustration; it is a predictable outcome of institutional design.
Mimicry or Defiance? India in the Liberal World Order
If we look at Indian diplomacy and its interaction with multilateral institutions, it
reflects a broader pattern in the crisis of the liberal World order – there is
critique without abandonment of these multilateral institutions. At independence,
India was at a weak international position, both financially and militarily, thus it used
multilateralism under the framework of UN, non-alignment movement as means to
protect sovereignty and strengthen its position. A shift from this idealistic
multilateralism to strategic realism within multilateralism appeared post-1962. (Chatterjee & Maitra, 2025; Michael, 2018)
In the contemporary times, India has been consistently advocating for a reformed
multilateral framework, especially as seen in its push for expansion of the United Nation Security Council (UNSC) for decades. Indian officials often describe the UNSC as ‘outdated’ to the current realities, (IANS, 2024) yet India seeks a permanent seat. This point reflects India’s critique of pre-existing hierarchy within multilateralism, and not its abandonment as a whole. Besides, India strives to project itself not just as an individual voice, but as leader of the Global South working through platforms like G20, wherein, India’s 2023 presidency
supported inclusion of the African Union as a permanent member, (Bhattacharjee, 2023) thus showing engagement to reform the existing institutions instead of creating new ones.
Alongside the rise of “America First” or “China First” policy, one has witnessed frequent bypasses of multilateral trade norms and institutions. Events where China and the US engage in a G2 strategic interaction often pose a threat to India’s rising power aspirations (Gandhi, 2025). Be it China expanding footprints in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), an investment like the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), or the U.S. using tariff threats to influence India’s energy trade with Russia, such incidents hamper India’s independent trajectory (Khanna, 2011).
Here, India adopts a more assertive approach using the Strategic Autonomy as a ‘rationalization tool’ for issue-based choices, like its participation in the United States led QUAD in 2017 and simultaneously purchasing a Russian S-400 system in 2018. In response to China’s growing assertiveness ,India focuses on maritime multilateralism, as seen recently in Visakhapatnam with the International Fleet Review 2026, Exercise Milan 2026, 9th conclave of the chief of Indian Ocean Naval Symposium. All these activities reflect India’s strategic choices to operationalize the vision of MAHASAGAR (Maritime Heads for Active Security and Growth for All in the Region), as well as demonstrate India as a leading power in the Indian Ocean Regions alongside a maritime order. (Singh, 2026)
Furthermore, India consistently calls for a ‘reformed multilateralism’ which shows
the contemporary realities as observed in the UNSC, 2021, where it called for NORM (New Orientation for a Reformed Multilateral System). Even in the 80th United Nations General Assembly, the Indian external affairs minister – S. Jaishankar warned that “the
very concept of multilateralism is under attack” and called for South-South
solidarity in the backdrop of ongoing wars like in Ukraine and Gaza, and even the climate events (Ministry of External Affairs, 2025).
States in the Global South like India also represent another dimension of dilemma within multilateralism where crisis arises from internal administration before it arises in its interaction with the global order.
Tanvi Madan (2013), in “Shaping the Emerging World: India and Multilateral Order”, identifies areas of internal constraints, such as –
- Limited personal or diplomatic manpower,
- Blurred domestic and international line,
- Post-1989 coalition politics federalism,
- Media and public opinion, its backlash
- Corporate sector globalization
They show how realities and constraints can equally affect state position and interactions with multilateralism leading to reactive rather than proactive engagement. Also, India’s
engagement in institutions like with the geopolitical bloc – BRICS and New Development Bank (NDB), is often presented as an alternative to the Western-dominant institutions.
However, in practice, some Global South states often end up ‘mirroring’ the pre-existing multilateral institutions like the IMF, UNSC, others, hence reasserting that hierarchy benefits whoever is relatively stronger inside the particular institutions (inside the United Nations, India is disadvantaged as it lacks the veto power, but inside the QUAD, India is relatively advantaged as it has an equal say in all the decision-making agendas.)
This is why, for liberal world order, the crisis is not its death, but rather a struggle over vertical mobility within it. This reflects that India and similar Global South nations do not seek to make multilateralism redundant, but rather reflective and reactive to their own strategic needs.
Reading of the CONTEMPORARY Crisis
Therefore, the reading that the crisis of the liberal world order is contemporary – overlooks that its decline is not a sudden phenomenon, pushed further by recent nationalism or geopolitical rivalry, but rather a ‘surfacing of the inherent, internal tensions, already prevalent and present all along. Institutions stabilized these tensions for decades by providing rules and procedures that managed disagreement. But, as we know, stabilization does not equal resolution. Contradictions can remain contained for long periods and then reappear when material conditions shift.
Current great-power dynamics illustrate this point. When stakes are low, states often work through institutions. When stakes become high, they bypass them. Strategic bargaining between actors such as the United States and China frequently occurs outside formal multilateral settings, especially on security or technological issues. This does not mean institutions are irrelevant. It means their role is selective. They are most effective where major powers permit them to be effective. In that sense, institutions can constrain weaker states more consistently than stronger ones. This brings us back to the idea of crisis.
On the basis of a secondary interpretation of Immanuel Wallerstein’s (1974) “World System Theory” we can look at crisis as a cyclical theory at a global scale. So, this is just an idea we had that it may be more accurate to think of world orders as moving through recurring phases:
- Crisis generates institutionalization.
- Institutionalization produces temporary stabilization.
- Stabilization contains contradictions.
- Contradictions eventually generate new crises.
Here, we try to explain with the help of a flow chart how ‘crisis’ is repeated through various major events in history.
→ WWI Crisis led to formation of institution
→ League Of Nations
→ This created 1920s temporary Stability period
→ Contained contradictions like Revisionism + Depression + Fascism
→ Breakdown of Order
→ Leading to another crisis WWII
→ Again, institutions are formed like UN + Bretton Woods Settlement
→ Providing Cold War Stability ( bipolarity)
→ Internal contradictions arises – Decolonization + Ideological Rivalry
→ Leading to Systemic Shift
→ Ultimately Post-Cold War Crisis
→ Creation of Global Liberal Institutions (WTO etc.)
→ Multipolar Tensions arises + Legitimacy Strains
→ Emerging Systemic Crisis
Thus, the main idea is that a crisis does not indicate an external shock to an otherwise stable system. It can be produced in the inner domain of the system’s own apparatus. Hence, crisis is not contrary to the order, but rather a part of how the very same order reproduces with time. This way, multilateralism perseveres because it arranges hierarchy, and not because it solves or demolishes it. It gives regulations through which various unequal actors can interact without continuous confrontation. This function of multilateralism is useful, which is why institutions endure even when criticized. But endurance should not be confused with equality.
The current tension on multilateralism does not indicate that the entire liberal world order has plummeted. But instead, underline a phase in its in-progress accommodation. Post-war institutions were influenced within unequal power relations, and many of their contradictions display that origin. Be it discontent among developing nations, unequal negotiation results, and selective consent by big powers – all point to one thing: multilateralism was inherently hierarchical since its inception. What we see today is less of a sudden collapse resulting from a contemporary crisis and more of a moment of recognition of the same.
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