INDIA IN SOUTH ASIA: REGIONAL COOPERATION, DOMESTIC UNREST AND THE CHANGING NEIGHBOURHOOD

1. Abstract

This paper interrogates the dissonance between India’s aspirational identity as a ‘Viswaguru’ (world teacher) and the complex realities of its immediate South Asian neighbourhood. Its central research question asks: How do evolving regional security dynamics, combined with persistent domestic socio-political unrest, constrain and reshape India’s capacity for regional leadership and cooperative engagement? The methodology employs a comparative case study analysis, examining India’s bilateral relations with two pivotal neighbours—one characterized by historical tension and another by traditional amity now under strain—alongside a focused examination of recent episodes of significant domestic unrest. This dual-level analysis illuminates the recursive relationship between internal consolidation and external projection.

The significance of this study lies in its challenge to conceptions of foreign policy as a purely external endeavour. It argues that the ‘Neighbourhood First’ policy’s efficacy is fundamentally contingent upon domestic stability and inclusive governance. The paper posits that internal fractures, including majoritarian polarization and ethno-regional tensions, directly impede strategic coherence and weaken regional trust, providing openings for extra-regional powers.

Expected results indicate a paradoxical scenario where India’s material and geopolitical stature grows, while its perceived reliability as a cooperative regional leader diminishes. The study concludes that without addressing the critical nexus between domestic harmony and foreign policy credibility, India’s ‘Viswaguru’ ambition will remain incongruent with its regional reality, potentially leading to a more transactional and securitized neighbourhood policy, thereby undermining sustained regional integration and collective resilience.

Keywords: Viswaguru, South Asia, Regional Cooperation, Neighbourhood First Policy, Collective Resilience

• Introduction

In the evolving tapestry of 21st-century geopolitics, India has asserted an ambitious role for itself, encapsulated in the ancient yet rejuvenated concept of becoming a ‘Viswaguru’ or world teacher. This vision, as articulated by its political leadership, is not merely of a rising power but of a benevolent global guide, espousing values of peace, sustainability, and democratic resilience. However, the stark and often turbulent realities of its immediate South Asian neighbourhood present a formidable paradox. While India’s global stature, economic heft, and geopolitical manoeuvrability are undeniably on the ascent, its backyard remains a theatre of persistent challenges: historical animosities, fragile states, cross-border terrorism, and increasing strategic competition from extra-regional actors. Compounding this external complexity is the spectre of intensifying domestic socio-political unrest, marked by deepening communal fault lines, ethno-regional agitations, and debates over the nature of Indian democracy itself. This paper posits that the pursuit of the ‘Viswaguru’ ideal cannot be disentangled from the dual pressures of regional insecurity and internal discord. It is at the fraught intersection of foreign policy ambition and domestic political coherence that India’s capacity for genuine regional leadership will be determined.

• Research Objective

The primary objective of this research is to critically analyse the dissonance between India’s aspirational identity as a ‘Viswaguru’ and the on-ground complexities within South Asia. It seeks to understand how the interplay between evolving regional security dynamics and persistent domestic socio-political unrest constrains, reshapes, and defines the practical contours of India’s regional leadership and its flagship ‘Neighbourhood First’ policy.

• Research Question

How do evolving regional security dynamics, combined with persistent domestic socio-political unrest, constrain and reshape India’s capacity for regional leadership and cooperative engagement in South Asia?

• Literature Review

The scholarly discourse on India’s foreign policy and regional role spans several interconnected themes: the conceptualisation of its global identity, the dynamics of South Asian regionalism, the impact of domestic politics, and the strategies of engagement in an era of strategic competition.

The notion of India as a ‘Viswaguru’ or a unique civilisational state destined for global leadership has gained significant traction in official and popular narratives. Shashi Tharoor, in Pax Indica (2012), frames India’s potential as a “soft power superpower,” arguing that its democratic pluralism, cultural richness, and moral authority from its freedom struggle form the bedrock of its global appeal. This perspective is echoed in works like India: A global soft power leader in the 21st century by Luxmi & Kashyap (2024), which catalogue India’s cultural and diplomatic outreach. However, this aspirational literature often operates at a macro, global level, sometimes underplaying the granular challenges of the immediate neighbourhood.

Conversely, a substantial body of work focuses specifically on South Asia’s regional security complex. The enduring rivalry with Pakistan, extensively documented in analyses like the House of Lords Library briefing on Tensions between India and Pakistan (2025), remains the primary security dilemma, consuming disproportionate diplomatic and military resources. The rise of China’s influence in the region, through initiatives like the Belt and Road, has fundamentally altered the strategic calculus. Aparna Pande (2025), in her analysis of India’s multi-alignment, notes that while India seeks strategic autonomy, Chinese inroads in Nepal, Sri Lanka, and the Maldives compel a more reactive and often securitised neighbourhood policy.

Theoretical underpinnings of India’s world view are provided by its key practitioners. External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar, in The India Way (2020), articulates a pragmatic, interest-driven foreign policy for an “uncertain world,” moving beyond idealistic non-alignment. His subsequent reflections in Why Bharat Matters (2024) emphasise cultural confidence and civilizational continuity as foreign policy drivers. This aligns with broader debates on world order. Henry Kissinger’s World Order (2014), as analysed by McDougall (2014), provides a framework for understanding how different regions conceive legitimacy and power, a context in which India’s civilizational claims are positioned. J. Ramesh’s Making Sense of Chindia (2004) offers an earlier comparative lens, highlighting how India’s democratic, chaotic model contrasts with China’s authoritarian efficiency, impacting their respective regional approaches.

A critical, yet less integrated, strand of literature examines the domestic determinants of foreign policy. The assumption that foreign policy is a discrete, elite-driven domain is increasingly challenged. Internal cohesion, or the lack thereof, has direct external ramifications. The Security Council Report’s forecast on Multilateralism (2025) implicitly highlights how domestic political pressures in major states can impede international cooperation. The Aragalaya protest movement in Sri Lanka (Timberman, 2025), while a case study of a neighbour, is illustrative of how internal upheaval can paralyse a state and drastically alter its foreign policy engagements, inviting external mediation.

Despite these rich streams, a significant gap exists in synthesising these internal and external pressures specifically concerning India’s regional leadership claims. Much of the literature either celebrates India’s global rise, dissects South Asian security in isolation, or analyses domestic politics inwardly. There is insufficient systematic exploration of how specific episodes of major domestic unrest within India—communal violence, agrarian protests, or federal tensions—directly corrode its credibility and leverage in South Asia. This paper seeks to bridge that gap, arguing that the ‘Viswaguru’ project is as vulnerable to internal fractures as it is to external geopolitical shifts.

• Theoretical Framework

This study is anchored in an adapted neoclassical realist framework, infused with constructivist insights on identity. Neoclassical realism posits that a state’s foreign policy is shaped not only by its relative material power in the international system (the systemic level) but also by how that power is filtered through intervening domestic variables, such as state capacity, elite perceptions, and societal cohesion (Rose, 1998). This provides a robust lens for analysing India: its growing material capabilities (economic size, military strength) create an objective basis for regional leadership (the independent variable). However, the translation of this power into effective, legitimate, and sustained influence (the dependent variable) is mediated by critical domestic-level factors.

The primary intervening variables in this analysis are:

1. Domestic Socio-Political Cohesion: This refers to the degree of consensus or conflict within Indian society on fundamental issues of identity, citizenship, and resource distribution. Majoritarian polarization, ethno-regional tensions (e.g., in Manipur or Punjab), and large-scale protest movements (e.g., the farmers’ protests) are manifestations of low cohesion. Neoclassical realism predicts that such internal fragmentation diverts elite attention, drains state resources towards management of unrest, and projects an image of instability, thereby constraining assertive and consistent foreign policy execution.
2. Perceived Reliability and Credibility: This is a perceptual variable constructed both domestically and internationally. Constructivist theory emphasises that state identity and reputation are socially constructed through practice and narrative (Wendt, 1992). India’s ‘Viswaguru’ identity is a projected self-image. Its reception in South Asia, however, depends on the perceived congruence between this benevolent, leadership claim and India’s actual conduct—both externally (as a cooperative neighbour) and internally (as a harmonious, plural democracy). Persistent domestic discord creates a credibility gap; neighbours may perceive India as preaching global values it struggles to uphold at home, thereby weakening its moral authority.

The framework thus establishes a recursive relationship: Systemic pressures (China’s rise, US expectations) → Increase India’s material power and leadership aspirations (‘Viswaguru’) → Domestic unrest and incoherence (intervening variable) → Erode credibility and strategic focus → Weaken effective regional power projection and cooperation → Altered regional outcomes (more transactional relations, external power inroads).

This approach moves beyond purely systemic explanations (e.g., balancing China) or purely agent-centric ones (e.g., leadership style), to foreground the critical, under-studied interface where domestic politics meets and shapes regional statecraft.

• Research Gap

The existing literature on India’s foreign policy, while voluminous, tends to operate in silos. Significant scholarship details India’s global strategic engagements, its ‘multi-alignment’ manoeuvres (Pande, 2025), and its ambitions on the world stage, often linking them to civilizational narratives like ‘Viswaguru’. A parallel, robust body of work analyses the intractable security dynamics of South Asia, focusing on India-Pakistan enmity, the China factor, and bilateral relations with neighbours like Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka. A third, inward-looking corpus examines the complexities of India’s domestic politics, including rising majoritarianism, federal challenges, and social movements.

The critical research gap lies at the confluence of these three streams. There is a paucity of integrated analysis that systematically examines how specific, consequential episodes of domestic socio-political unrest directly impact India’s regional policy efficacy and perceived leadership credibility. Most analyses of the ‘Neighbourhood First’ policy focus on diplomatic overtures, economic incentives, or security responses, treating domestic politics as a background constant. Conversely, studies of domestic unrest seldom trace their direct foreign policy consequences beyond general statements about “distracting the government.”

This study identifies and addresses this gap. It does not treat domestic unrest as mere background noise but as an active, intervening variable that filters India’s power and reshapes its regional interactions. By employing a comparative case study method—juxtaposing relations with a traditionally hostile neighbour (Pakistan) and a traditionally friendly one now under strain (e.g., Sri Lanka or Nepal)—alongside analysis of concurrent domestic turmoil, it seeks to illuminate this recursive dynamic. The gap, therefore, is one of linkage and causation: explicitly connecting the dots between internal fractures and external constraints on India’s coveted role as a benevolent regional ‘teacher’ and leader.

• Discussion

The dissonance between India’s ‘Viswaguru’ ambition and its regional reality is not merely rhetorical; it is operational, playing out in the day-to-day conduct of neighbourhood policy. This discussion examines this interplay through the dual lenses of regional security dynamics and domestic unrest, drawing on contemporary cases.

Regional Dynamics Constraining Leadership: The South Asian neighbourhood remains a tough arena. The historic rivalry with Pakistan, as detailed in the House of Lords Library report (2025), ensures a permanent state of securitisation on the western front, consuming diplomatic energy and military resources that could be deployed for positive regional integration. More significantly, China’s expansive economic and strategic footprint across South Asia has transformed the region into a theatre of Sino-Indian competition. Nepal’s tilt towards China on transit and development projects, Sri Lanka’s debt-driven entanglement with Beijing, and the Maldives’ recent ‘India Out’ campaign exemplify this. India’s response, often reactive and coercive (as seen in the 2015-2016 blockade of Nepal or economic pressure on the Maldives), undermines its narrative of benevolent leadership and pushes neighbours to seek external balancers. Furthermore, global crises like the Iran-Israel war (Wikipedia, 2025) create complex ripples, testing India’s delicate balancing act between its West Asian partners and impacting energy security and diaspora concerns, further stretching its strategic bandwidth.

The Domestic Fracture-Foreign Policy Nexus: India’s internal socio-political landscape directly impedes coherent regional engagement in several ways. First, majoritarian nationalist discourse, while potentially consolidating a domestic political base, often alienates neighbouring Muslim-majority nations like Bangladesh and the Maldives, where it is perceived as antagonistic. This damages the soft-power appeal of India’s pluralist democracy. Second, severe episodes of domestic unrest act as a massive diversion. For instance, the year-long farmers’ protest (2020-2021) commanded the government’s supreme attention, arguably diluting focus on critical regional developments, such as political crisis in Nepal or the final stages of the US withdrawal from Afghanistan. Third, as Jaishankar (2020) notes, foreign policy requires “strategic autonomy,” but acute internal polarization makes bipartisan consensus on external affairs nearly impossible, leading to policy volatility and an inability to credibly commit to long-term regional initiatives.

Case in Point: The Sri Lankan Conundrum. The crisis in Sri Lanka offers a poignant example. India extended over $4 billion in assistance during Sri Lanka’s 2022 economic collapse, demonstrating the operational heft of ‘Neighbourhood First’. This was a clear attempt to project reliable leadership and counter Chinese influence. However, the internal dimension is crucial. The Aragalaya protest movement (Timberman, 2025) that ousted the Rajapaksas was a powerful, youth-driven democratic upsurge. India’s historical ties are with established political elites, often from the Sinhala majority. A consistent ‘Viswaguru’, championing democratic values, might have found ways to more visibly engage with or support this organic civic movement. Instead, a cautious, state-centric approach was adopted, partly driven by a domestic political aversion to being seen as endorsing street protests—a sensitivity born of India’s own experience with large-scale agitations. This highlights how domestic political calculus can inhibit a full-spectrum, values-based engagement, even during a strategic opportunity.

The Global-Structural Bind: India’s global rise also creates its own set of neighbourhood pressures. Its assertive stance on global trade, as seen in its refusal to “bow down” to US tariff demands (Al Jazeera, 2025), projects strength and strategic autonomy. However, this same assertiveness can translate into a harder line with smaller neighbours, making cooperation appear more transactional. As India engages more with Quad, BRICS, and global councils (Security Council Report, 2025), there is a risk that South Asia is taken for granted or viewed through a purely competitive, security lens vis-à-vis China, rather than as a community for shared destiny. The ‘Neighbourhood First’ policy then risks becoming a tool for denial (denying space to China) rather than affirmative regional building.

In essence, the discussion reveals a vicious cycle: Regional threats (Pakistan, China) and opportunities (crisis in Sri Lanka) demand a coherent, credible, and consistent Indian response. However, domestic unrest and polarization undermine that coherence and credibility. This, in turn, weakens regional trust, leading neighbours to hedge their bets with China, which further exacerbates India’s security concerns, prompting a more securitised and less cooperative policy—a far cry from the ‘Viswaguru’ ideal.

• Findings

The analysis yields several key findings that illustrate the constrained and reshaped nature of India’s regional leadership:

1. The Paradox of Power: India’s material and geopolitical stature is undeniably growing, evidenced by its robust global positioning, economic resilience, and multi-alignment success. However, this growth has not translated into proportional trust or perceived reliability as a cooperative regional leader in South Asia. Neighbours increasingly view India through a lens of strategic necessity or fear of coercion rather than benevolent leadership.
2. Domestic Unrest as a Strategic Drain: Major episodes of domestic socio-political unrest are not merely internal affairs; they act as a critical intervening variable that siphons political attention, administrative bandwidth, and diplomatic capital away from sustained regional engagement. They force the government into a reactive, inward-looking mode, often at precisely the moments when proactive regional statesmanship is required.
3. The Credibility Gap of the ‘Viswaguru’: The projection of a ‘Viswaguru’ identity, rooted in moral authority and civilizational wisdom, is critically undermined by persistent domestic fractures along communal, ethnic, and ideological lines. This creates a palpable credibility gap where India’s external preaching of pluralism, harmony, and democratic resilience is contradicted by internal realities, weakening its soft power appeal among neighbours.
4. Erosion of ‘Neighbourhood First’ as a Cooperative Framework: The ‘Neighbourhood First’ policy is increasingly practiced as a mix of transactional economic diplomacy and strategic denial (of Chinese influence), rather than as a framework for genuine, collective resilience-building. Domestic political narratives that emphasise civilizational greatness and nationalism can unintentionally breed a posture of primacy rather than partnership, alienating smaller neighbours sensitive to sovereignty.
5. The Recursive Spiral: A recursive relationship is confirmed: domestic incoherence projects an image of instability and distraction, reducing India’s ability to act as a predictable anchor during regional crises. This perception pushes neighbours toward external alternatives (chiefly China), which in turn heightens India’s threat perception, leading to a more securitised, less generous, and ultimately less effective neighbourhood policy—further eroding the foundations for collective regional resilience.
6. The Primacy of the Internal-External Nexus: The study conclusively finds that the efficacy of foreign policy, particularly in a sensitive and interconnected region like South Asia, is fundamentally contingent on a threshold level of domestic stability and inclusive governance. Without addressing the critical nexus between domestic harmony and foreign policy credibility, India’s external ambitions will remain structurally hampered.
7. Conclusion

India’s journey towards its proclaimed destiny as a ‘Viswaguru’ will be determined not only on the global high tables but crucially in the fraught and complex theatre of South Asia. This paper demonstrates that the region presents a paradox where growing national power coexists with diminishing cooperative influence. The critical constraint emerges from within: domestic socio-political unrest erodes the strategic coherence, consistent attention, and moral credibility essential for benevolent leadership. Until India convincingly manages the nexus between its internal harmony and its external aspirations, its ‘Viswaguru’ ambition will remain aspirational, and its neighbourhood policy will likely trend towards transactional securitisation, undermining the very regional stability and collective resilience it seeks to foster.

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