We are all witnesses to a twenty first century global order which is being shaped by shifting gravitas of power and its diffusion. It is increasingly being structured around a messier reality of a triangular configuration under strain, involving USA, Russia and China. India, amidst of this geometrical power imbalance, which presents a critical test for middle powers, stands at a pivotal position, balancing pressures from all sides. This paper tends to pose a central question: Where does Chinese territorial expansion fit within this triangular dynamic and how does it shape India’s strategic choices that engages with US-led sanction regimes and continued partnerships with Russia?
Existing scholarship on this tends to frame India’s foreign policy as revivalism of the Non alignment or its tactical flexibility in simultaneously engaging with the great powers. Whereas this interpretation on one hand looks descriptive and static, it treats India’s policy as mere balanced ambiguity and fails to explain or specify why India is expanding engagement with the United States and simultaneously retaining Russia as a balancing partner, deepening strategic and defense ties with it. The core argument lies here: India’s constant oscillation between USA and Russia and its engagement with Russia is not anti-West reflex or a result of any cold war nostalgia. It is to maintain a structural hedge which serves as strategic insurance preventing over-dependence of Washington and simultaneously managing the Beijing threat to ensure prevention of Sino Russian consolidation.
Drawing from theories on structural realism (Kenneth waltz), Mearsheimer’s liberal hegemony critique and middle power theories by Evelyn Goh, Andrew cooper and others, this paper tends to reconstruct and reinterpret India’s strategic autonomy as not mere neutrality but calibrated motion defined by competing pulls in a turbulent, volatile world.
KEYWORDS: Strategic Autonomy, Triangular Great Power Politics, Indian Foreign Policy, Sino Russian Alignment, Chinese Expansion
Strategic Autonomy in a Triangular World Order: India between Moscow, Washington and Beijing
“The overriding goal of each state is to maximize its share of world power”
-John Mearsheimer, “The Tragedy of Great Powers”
The contemporary world order is standing on the three S’s of the international relations: sanctions, summits and survival where great powers compete and middle powers calculate to survive. Following the Russia Ukraine War, in 2022, Russia briefly became India’s biggest crude oil supplier[1], sometimes even accounting for roughly one third of imports[2]. Simultaneously, India is expanding strategic and technological cooperation with USA, (US, India initiative on critical and emerging technology [iCET][3] and intensified Quad engagement in the Indo Pacific[4]) and we are seeing military deployments across the Himalayan frontier[5] following the 2020 Galwan clash between India and China while simultaneously witnessing China’s maritime expansion in the Indian Ocean[6]. One could always ask, what do these constant conflictual changes unfold and what do they imply for India: a nostalgia for non-alignment or systemic adaptation in a triangular world order? How does Chinas territorial assertiveness and expansion in particular, pushes India’s calibrated autonomy amidst great power politics and sanction regimes?
Before we look at India’s current position in the shifting global order and revisit its historical foundations tracing the deeper currents that have over the time shaped its foreign policy. We know that, India’s commitment to non-alignment dates back to the time of its independence, avoiding rigid blocs. As Shivshankar Menon notes in his India’s Foreign Affairs Tragedy (2020), “since independence… in each [world order] it followed a strategy of non-alignment while adjusting tactically to the realities of power”[7] what served as a geopolitical jolt to this strategy was the fall of Soviet Union in 1991 which resulted in loss of soviet support and us unipolar dominance exposing India to new external pressures including nuclear nonproliferation demands from the US. India’s response was to diversify its diplomatic architecture by becoming an active participant in various multilateral platforms like G20, BRICS and IBSA exploring a Russia-India-China framework beginning in 2002.[8]
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK:
The international system as put forward by Mearsheimer in his The Tragedy Of Great Powers is an arena of tragedy[9] and the absence of central authority forces states into a struggle for power to ensure their own survival. Before we analyze the historical evolution of India’s strategic autonomy and its relations with the powers in the triangular configuration, looking at the theoretical landscape governing India’s interactions with these players would contribute to our understanding of the fact that India’s historical and contemporary pursuit of strategic autonomy i.e., the capacity to make independent foreign policy decisions based on national interest without external coercion, is not merely a policy choice but a structural necessity driven by the anarchic nature of global politics.[10]
The concept of offensive realism as put forward by Mearsheimer stands on five key assumptions: firstly, the international system is anarchic, which means, in plain words, there is no government over governments to enforce agreements or protect them. Secondly, all great powers possess offensive military capabilities that can harm other states. Third, states can never be sure or entirely certain about the intentions of other states and then these intentions can change rapidly over time. Fourth, survival, is the primary goal of states because only a state that survives can pursue its objectives. The last of it being that states are rational actors that think strategically about how to survive in an external environment. (FIG. 1)
Drawing from these assumptions, he claims that states are incentivized to maximize their shares of power. Hence according to Mearsheimer, it is a “self-help” world and the most powerful state is the most secure here. Now the question to be addressed: where does Mearsheimer’s logic fit for India?
Mearsheimer’s logic of survival for India implies that the rise of China is more than a regional development: it is a systemic threat. Mearsheimer’s offensive realism predicts that as China grows wealthier and more powerful, it will be inevitable for it to seek to dominate Asia and push USA out of its vicinity. India then as a proximate power is only fated to enter a security competition with China to prevent the latter from achieving regional hegemony.
Mearsheimer further in his book, the “Great Delusion” provides a critique of the dominant foreign policy of the USA from 1991 to 2017 whose strategy is based on democratic peace, economic interdependence and power of international institutions. Mearsheimer’s critique stems from the fact that “liberal hegemony” was a “near total failure” that produced unnecessary wars and created the mess of the current global order. For India, this critique is significant because it validates New Delhi’s long-standing skepticism of US interventionism and moralizing rhetoric. India has historically preferred a Westphalian model emphasizing sovereignty and non-interference, often rejecting the “liberal” rules-based order championed by the West. Mearsheimer’s assertion that realism and nationalism are more powerful forces than liberal ideals justify India’s focus on internal consolidation and its refusal to be drawn into “ideological contests” between democracy and autocracy.[11]
FIG.1
Evelyn Goh’s research, shows us how secondary states navigate great power rivalry without formally balancing or band wagoning moving beyond a binary choice identifying triangulation as an important strategy for middle and secondary powers which involves engaging with the competing global powers which ensures no single power dominating. With respect to India, its behavior in the Indo Pacific where it, on one hand, participates in US led quad while maintaining “Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership” with Russia serves as a great example of “triangulation” to end up creating an order where USA remains as a superpower to check China maintain enough strategic depth to preserve its autonomy.[12]
Evelyn Goh in her “Great powers and hierarchical order in South- East Asia” discusses about how secondary states maneuver within hierarchical and competitive structures and hereby conceptualizes this very triangulation as a strategy where secondary states or middle powers position themselves between competing powers to maximize their strategic benefits and preserve autonomy.[13] Andrew cooper in his book “The diplomatic aftermath of Iraq war: middle powers, soft balancing and coalition building” provides us a similar definition of triangulation arguing that middle powers enhance their diplomatic leverage by positioning themselves between competing blocs to broker outcomes beyond their material rank.[14]
Another framework that this could fit into comes from Cheng- Chwee Kuik’s analytical framework for hedging which is defined as a set of manually counteracting maneuvers pursued concurrently to offset risks. Hence, his most widely sought-after definition of hedging implies: “Hedging refers to insurance-seeking behavior under conditions of high uncertainty and high stakes, where a state pursues opposite or contradictory measures to offset multiple risks.”[15] For India, its reluctance to join formal military alliance is a very classical hedging move.
STRATEGIC AUTONOMY DURING COLD WAR: A BRIEF HISTORY
When we talk about the era in the sphere of international relations which was marked by proxy wars, deterrence and brinkmanship- the Cold War (1945- 1991) India’s pursuit of strategic autonomy was not moral idealism or neutrality in this period but it can be perceived as a calculated response to bipolarity and its constraints. Had they would have adopted alignment, it would have put to risk both their sovereignty and their developmental priorities. Hence it chose non-alignment as a strategy to preserve its decision-making autonomy within a rigid bipolar order.
The institutional expression of this approach was evident through the formation of the Non Aligned movement in 1961 alongside leaders such as Josip Broz, Tito and Gamal Abdel Nasser. However, this approach to non-alignment must not be misunderstood as mere equidistance from Washington and Moscow. Nehru explained that non-alignment did not mean neutrality but freedom to judge issues based on India’s own interests and conscience, not prisoner to bloc politics.[16] This allowed to flexibility of extraction of economic and military assistance from both the blocks without any commitments. Hence Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru framed non-alignment as an extension of anti-colonial sovereignty. Yet its logic was deeply realist. Nonalignment was hence a buffer strategy which enabled India to save itself from getting absorbed into block politics thereby maintaining diplomatic flexibility.
When we analyze India’s cold war behavior from a theoretical standpoint one would, find that it resembles a blend of structural realism and proto-hedging because under bipolarity completely balancing between the two poles was impossible for a materially weaker state which made India to pursue diversified engagement and coalition building in the Global South which widened its strategic space.
Hence it would be wrong to conclude that the cold war strategic autonomy was not driven by Idealism but was survival through maneuvering which laid the foundations of contemporary strategic autonomy behavior in today’s triangular order. One could, however, always claim that there is perceived difference in structural context in today’s world order (bipolar rigidity then, triangular fluidity now) but the logic of autonomy carried out through strategic positioning, remains the same.
TRIANGURALITY AND SHIFTS IN GLOBAL ORDER
Since the Cold War, the nature of the world order has been very much in debate. During cold war, there were two poles of power; USA and the USSR. In this proxy war era, India, along with other third-world countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, did not align with either the USA or USSR, but rather formed the Non-Aligned Movement through which they wanted to be facilitated by both centers of power without compromising sovereign autonomy. But, after the Soviet disintegration, for a certain amount of time, 1991-2008, a unipolar world order, dominated by the US, was envisioned by scholars. Over time, two alternative centers of power- Russia and China emerged to challenge the hegemony of the US. Over the years, we have witnessed the intensification of US-China rivalry, US-Russia rivalry, especially after the Ukrainian crisis, and increasing strategic proximity of China-Russia through several incidents. Though there was tension in the first half of the Cold War, due to ideological battle, after the Nixon-Mao secret pact of 1971, the relationship was normalized. From helping China to get the membership of the WTO in 2001 to the investment of US MNCs in China, the US helped China to achieve material prosperity. The rivalry between the US and China again emerged out of the 2008 financial crisis. The strategic cooperation between the US and China came to an end, and the rivalry began. In the case of Sino-Russia relations, China immediately aligned with the USSR after the formation of the PRC under the leadership of Mao Zedong in 1949 due to ideological affinity and also economic necessity. They signed the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance in 1950. After the death of Stalin, the denunciation of Stalin by Nikita Khrushchev in 1956 made Sino-Soviet relations troublesome, as Mao saw this as a revisionist position, an ideological betrayal. The Sino- Soviet tension emerged. The Soviet advisor’s withdrawal from China in 1960, armed border clashes in 1969 over an island on the Ussuri River, made the tension more serious. During the late Cold War, when China normalized its relationship with the US, both the US and China saw the USSR as the primary threat and cooperated indirectly against the expansion of the USSR in Asia. The Sino-Russian relations normalized after the Soviet disintegration in 1991. In 2001, they signed the Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation and Co-founded Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). After Russia annexed Crimea, the western states sanctioned Russia, but Russia and China moved closer. In contemporary times, they both see the US hegemony as a common primary threat. These three poles of power together create a triangular world order, which impacts the strategic autonomy of the third-world developing countries, including India.
The current Sino-Russian consolidation is threatening for India as it reduces the scope of choice for external decision-making. India and China both were decolonized more or less at the same time (India in 1947, China in 1949). After independence, Prime Minister Nehru was optimistic about the relationship between the PRC and India. In 1954, they signed the Panchasheel Agreement, the five principles of peaceful coexistence. “Hindi-Chini bhai bhai” became the most outspoken rhetoric about their relations. Though in 1950, China claimed control over Tibet, which was accepted by India, the mutual trust collapsed over giving asylum to the Dalai Lama in India. The border dispute over Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh caused the Indo-China war in 1962, which altered the mutual peaceful coexistence to permanent tension. In 1988, during the era of Rajiv Gandhi, there was an attempt to normalize the relationship, and Confidence-building agreements were signed, which results China becoming India’s largest trading partner by the 2000s. In June 2020, the clash between Indian and Chinese soldiers in Galwan Valley, where 20 Indian soldiers were killed, again marked the commencement of the tension between the two states. In reaction to this incident, the Indian government banned many Chinese apps. Due to these experiences, unresolved border disputes and growing China – Pakistan strategic nexus, China has become a security threat for India. India has a deep and long-term strategic partnership with Russia. In the 1965 Indo-Pak war and in the war of 1971, the USSR stood beside India diplomatically. India has deep defense and energy cooperation with Russia. But the increasing proximity between China and Russia could be a huge security concern and structural pressure for India. Russia is not merely a defense supplier for India; it acts as a systematic variable. In the triangular dynamics, India’s foreign policy towards the great powers – the US, Russia, and China – heavily depends on Russia’s position. If Russia tilts towards China, it will vastly impact India’s interaction with these powers; India would have to heavily depend on the US, which will cost India’s strategic autonomy; China will get leverage to pressure India, influence Central Asia, and improve the bargaining power of China in BRICS and SCO; it will also impact the defense ties with Russia. So, Russia’s position is strategically important and pivot for India’s strategic choice. India’s response to the Ukraine conflict is an example of structural hedging under triangular strain. In the context of the 2022 Russia-Ukraine war crisis, India abstained in multiple UNGA resolutions condemning China. Despite the sanctions from the West, India kept buying oil in discounted price from Russia. Simultaneously, India also continued to pursue Indo-Pacific initiatives and strategic dialogues with Washington. This structural distance helps India to keep away from enmity from both sides. This structural hedging is important to protect India’s national interest and maintain a balance between the two sides of power.
CHALLENGES
In the triangular dynamics, India maintains structural autonomy in making foreign policy. But this autonomy does not mean complete freedom of making choices; the structure of the order itself poses significant challenges to decision-making. In the case of India, there are three important structural constraints:
China’s military pressure: The unresolved border issue between China and India, China’s large military capacity, coercive strategies, and continuous military deployment at the border, together create a security dilemma for India. This security dilemma had proved through the Galwan Valley clash in 2020. For this reason, India seeks strategic and defense ties with powerful states like the US, for military cooperation and strategic backing. In this way, China’s military pressure reduces the strategic autonomy of India and forced to strategic convergence with other power.
US Sanction pressure: The US enforced the CAATSA sanctions law through which the US can sanction any state. This possibility of sanction haunts India, though no sanctions were ultimately imposed. India has defense ties with the US, India has trade relations of advanced technologies with the US, and US sanctions would affect India economically. So, the fear of sanctions forces India to calculate before taking any decision.
Economic Dependence on China: Currently, China remains one of the India’s largest import sources of Electronics inputs, Pharma ingredients, and Industrial components and major trading partner. India’s economy is also to some extent dependent on China. Without any economic plan, escalation with China would cost India. Economic interdependence limits India’s aggressive choices.
Opportunity:
The strategic autonomy of India exists because India has leverage in several areas. The US wants to manage the rise of China as an alternative global power and in Indo-pacific. To do this, the US need India, so India gets US Technology access through QUAD and ICET (Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technologies). This mutual dependence preserves India’s autonomy.
After Russia attacked Ukraine, the West sanctioned Russia in trading, but India continued to buy energy from Russia in cheap price, which strengthens India’s economic stability. Economic stability is important for maintaining autonomy.
To maintain external autonomy, India must reduce its dependence on other states. External autonomy requires internal capacity. India must become self-sufficient in order to achieve autonomy and reduce its imports. India has taken such initiative like “Atmanirbhar Bharat”. Less dependence will lead to more bargaining power, which will eventually lead to more autonomy.
CONCLUSION
To conclude, this paper tends to argue that India’s strategic autonomy in a triangular world order is not nostalgic non alignment or even passive neutrality but, in its essence, a structural adaptation to systemic pressures. Chinese expansion indeed does function as the primary driver of India’s calibrated engagement with both Russia and the USA. India’s abstention on Russia-related resolutions, continued oil purchases, and parallel expansion of Quad engagement are not contradictions; they are manifestations of hedging and triangulation under conditions of high uncertainty. Hence, this tumultuous and shifting triangular order compresses and decompresses India’s strategic space and future prospects play a central role.
An appropriate policy for maintaining strategic autonomy in the triangular dynamics would largely depend on the existing scenario in the world order. There might be several scenarios in this order. If the US-China rivalry hardens and Russia tilts towards China, it would be strategically more difficult for India than if Russia maintains its current position towards China and India. India should be prepared with suitable internal and external policies for any situation to tackle in this uncertain world order.
- To gain financial autonomy, India must develop domestic industries.
- To reduce US dependency for advance technologies, India has to develop large technological hubs.
- Increase the defence budget.
[1] https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/india-russian-oil-imports-share-2023-12-XX/
[2] https://www.iea.org/reports/oil-market-report
[3] https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/01/31/fact-sheet-u-s-india-initiative-on-critical-and-emerging-technology-icet/
[4] https://www.mea.gov.in/quad.htm
[5] https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/india-china-lac-military-deployment-XXXXX/
[6] https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/china-navy-indian-ocean-XXXX/
[7] https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/India27s-foreign-affairs-strategy.pdf#:~:text=strategy%20of%20non,led%20to%20the%20arms%20races
[8] https://rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/idss/ip25015-understanding-indias-evolving-policy-of-strategic-autonomy/#:~:text=In%20response%2C%20India%20hedged%20against,as%20a%20distinct%20triangular%20partnership
[9] Mearsheimer, J. J. (2014). The tragedy of great power politics (Updated ed.). New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company.
[10] https://forumias.com/blog/strategic-autonomy-in-a-multipolar-world-order/
[11] https://macmillan.yale.edu/stories/john-j-mearsheimer-liberal-ideals-and-international-realities https://eustochos.com/india-strategic-autonomy-in-an-age-of-fracture/
[12] Goh, E., & Simon, S. W. (Eds.). (2007). China, the United States, and South-East Asia: Contending perspectives on politics, security, and economics. Routledge.
[13] Evelyn Goh, “Great Powers and Hierarchical Order in Southeast Asia,” International Security 32, no. 3 (2007/08): 113–157.
[14] Andrew F. Cooper, The Diplomatic Aftermath of the Iraq War: Middle Powers, Soft Balancing, and Coalition Building (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2008).
[15] Kuik, Cheng-Chwee. 2016. “How Do Weaker States Hedge? Unpacking ASEAN States’ Alignment Behavior toward China.” Journal of Contemporary China 25, no. 100: 500–514.
[16] Jawaharlal Nehru, quoted in “India and the Non-Aligned Movement,” Foreign relations of India (Wikipedia), accessed March 5, 2026, on non-alignment as freedom of judgment; A. Appadorai, cited in dissertation, “India’s Policy of Non-Alignment” (PhD diss., University of Pittsburgh), on non-alignment as an independent approach to foreign policy; S. Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru: A Biography, excerpt on Nehru defending independent judgment under pressure.
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